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When people are asked to recall an event on multiple occasions (e.g., comparing the details 
reported in an initial eyewitness interview to what an eyewitness later reports at trial), it is likely 
that discrepancies in recall occur.  Over the course of multiple recall attempts, reminisced details 
are often reported, and prior research shows that these details are as likely to be accurate as 
details recalled consistently. But no research has examined the impact of collaboration on 
reminiscing. This is an important question because it is common for a crime to be seen by 
multiple witnesses. The goal of Experiment 1 is to examine how collaboration impacts recall 
consistency and reminiscing. Participants viewed 40 objects arranged on a table for five minutes. 
Participants either Individually completed four recall tests (IIII) or recalled once Individually, 
Collaborated once, and then completed two more Individual recall tests (ICII). The results 
revealed that the IIII condition reminisced more on test 3 and had higher accuracy in the objects 
they reminisced compared to the ICII condition. In other words, collaboration harmed the 
reminisce process. Experiment 2 used a video stimulus and found, on test 3, that the 
collaboration (ICII) condition reminisced more details and had higher accuracy in those details 
than the IIII condition. Two possibilities that can explain these differing results are that the 
Experiment 2 stimulus was an event that had a narrative making it easier to remember and there 
were more opportunities to reminisce since a video has more moving parts compared to the 
objects in Experiment 2.
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Examining How Collaborative Remembering Impacts Consistency in Recall 
Eyewitnesses often are asked to recall an event on multiple occasions. When a witness 
tries recalling a second or third time, they may recall details they failed to mention the first time; 
those details that were not reported initially are referred to as reminisced details. As a witness, 
when you take the stand it is your legal obligation to swear an oath:  a promise to “tell the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” The whole truth requests that you won’t leave 
information out; the completeness of the story matters (i.e., the number of correct details 
recalled); whereas nothing but the truth puts the focus on the accuracy of what is reported (i.e., 
don’t report things that are possibly incorrect). Much of what we recall from one attempt to 
another is correct and is recalled reliably. I will refer to these as Consistent details, details that 
were stated originally and are continuously recalled. Inconsistent recall, on the other hand, can 
take several forms. For example, Reminiscing occurs when details are reported that were not 
originally recalled, Intrusions occur by reporting a detail that was not originally viewed or 
studied, and Forgetting occurs when a detail reported at one time is subsequently not recalled. 
Stanley and Benjamin (2016) made the important point that in a courtroom, reminisced 
details can make a witness seem unreliable, because lawyers view these inconsistencies in 
memory recall as evidence that a witness is not credible. This is often done by using prior 
inconsistent statements made by the witness that contradict that witness’ testimony at trial (Alavi 
& Ahmad, 2002). Lawyers are trained to attack these inconsistencies and are skilled in doing so, 
even specifically asking a witness if they have inconsistencies in their statement (e.g., Has your 
testimony changed since your first statement?) (Alavi & Ahmad, 2002). The answer to these 
types of questions can make a witness appear unreliable. Consequently, reminiscing details can 
be seen as a red flag because newly remembered details become discrepancies that don’t match 
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what a witness said initially. In addition, some states (e.g., Florida) explicitly instruct jurors to 
decide the credibility of each witness by considering their inconsistencies, and provides jurors 
with lists of questions they should consider (“Ask yourself if the witness testified inconsistently 
on the witness stand, or if the witness said or did something (or failed to say something) at any 
given time that is inconsistent with what the witness said while testifying,” Six Circuit Criminal 
Pattern Jury Instructions, 2019). However, previous research has indicated that inconsistencies in 
memory are common and should not be seen as a signal that a person’s memory is unreliable 
(Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Krix, Sauerland, Lorei, & Rispens, 2015; Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). 
Research shows that reminisced memories are a normal occurrence both when 
individuals remember on their own or with others. Other literature has shown that witnesses 
often remember an event together with other witnesses. What is not clear is whether 
remembering with others leads individuals to reminisce more and how collaborating impacts the 
accuracy of what is reported. We begin by reviewing 1) what is known about reminiscence, 2) 
the opposing views regarding whether co-witnesses discussing amongst themselves is harmful or 
beneficial to memory, 3) analyze how collaborative memory has been studied and review 
findings that indicate that collaboration can boost reminiscing on later tests, and 4) finish by 
discussing how memory can be measured both by how much is remembered (referencing the 
whole truth in the sworn oath) and by the accuracy of the memories recalled (referencing the 
nothing but the truth portion of the oath).  
Reminisced Memories 
Several studies have identified reminiscence as a common phenomenon. Gilbert and 
Fisher (2006) manipulated the retrieval cues across witness interviews to examine how this 
impacts reminiscence over two time points. This was done by having participants view a bank 
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robbery video and then instructing them to write a detailed statement (Time 1). They were 
instructed to either write down everything they could remember (free recall) or they were asked 
to think about the crime they just witnessed according to one of four prompted options 
(chronological order, reverse order, adopt the police officer’s perspective, or adopt the robber’s 
perspective), using that prompt to explain the crime from the given perspective. Two days later 
(Time 2), participants returned to the laboratory and were asked again to freely recall the crime 
or told to describe it using one of the perspectives previously mentioned. Gilbert and  Fisher 
(2006) reported that 98% of their participants recalled at least two reminisced details and found 
that changing retrieval cues between test 1 and test 2 increased an individual’s amount of 
reminiscence.  
Stanley and Benjamin (2016) examined reminiscence to understand the relationship 
between consistency and accuracy in recall. They found that consistently recalled items were 
more accurate than reminisced and forgotten items. But importantly, items that were reminisced 
were found to be just as accurate as items that were forgotten (initially recalled but subsequently 
not reported). However, they did find that individuals who had more inconsistencies overall were 
likely to be less accurate in their overall recall. These findings suggest that inconsistencies in 
recall are not unusual but that reminisced details may not be too different from normally 
forgotten items. 
Similar to Stanley and Benjamin (2016), a study by Krix et al. (2015) that had 
participants view a theft video also found that reminisced and forgotten details had comparable 
levels of accuracy. Their overall results again supported the notion that reminiscing is a common 
occurrence; every participant had reminisced information. However, they found that the amount 
of reminiscence was not an indicator of overall accuracy, which suggests that witnesses should 
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not be discredited just because they reminisce details. Krix et al. (2015) also included an 
additional interesting element, an estimation group that consisted of police detectives who 
estimated the eyewitness’s overall accuracy across Time 1 and Time 2. The estimation group 
(the police officers) rated the reminisced details as being less accurate compared to consistent 
details. The officers were asked to justify why they rated reminisced details as being either 
accurate or inaccurate. The top two reasons for assigning low accuracy to reminisced details was: 
1) new information was suggestive of external influence, 2) the witness filled the gaps of the 
event in order to have a complete story. Moreover, although actual accuracy remained stable 
across both tests for the two memory groups, the estimation group believed that accuracy would 
decline on the second test (Krix et al., 2015). These results indicate that there are misconceptions 
regarding beliefs about recall consistency among police detectives that are contrary to actual 
recall performance. The police also routinely instruct witnesses not to speak to one another. Is 
this also a misconception; are police making the right call to avoid so-called co-witness effects?  
Co-Witness Effects 
Often times, an eyewitness recalls an event with multiple witnesses. Skagerberg and 
Wright (2008) examined sixty real co-witnesses from the Force Identification Unit in Brighton 
(UK). They reported that 88% of their sample had witnessed a crime with at least one other 
witness, and 58% of the witnesses had discussed the event with a co-witness. Studies have 
shown that when co-witnesses communicate, there may be “contamination” amongst one 
another’s memory (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Loftus, 2003; Shaw, Garven, & Wood, 
1997). Gabbert et al. (2003) showed pairs of participants a crime video. Each individual saw a 
different perspective of the video; however, they were led to believe that they both saw the same 
video. Participants then either had a memory discussion with another witness who viewed a 
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different perspective or did a memory rehearsal on their own. Lastly, an individual recall test was 
completed by each participant. They found that 60% of the participants in the co-witness 
condition reported information that they had personally not witnessed. Furthermore, many of the 
items reported were obtained from the memory discussion with the co-witness (Gabbert et al., 
2003). In another set of studies, Shaw et al. (1997; Study 2 & 3) had participants watch a robbery 
video and then questioned pairs (one participant and a confederate) about the event. The pair 
took turns answering questions about the crime and the confederate would sometimes state 
incorrect information. In both experiments, they found that when the participant had heard an 
incorrect answer from the co-witness “confederate” before they gave an answer, participants 
were more likely to give the incorrect answer they had just heard from the co-witness.  
Paterson and Kemp (2005) surveyed police officers and found that the common protocol 
was to keep the witnesses from communicating with each other, but many police officers stated 
that they believed that allowing co-witnesses to communicate came with some benefits. 
Specifically, when co-witnesses communicate, the discussion can cue a witness to remember 
details not remembered earlier (Paterson & Kemp, 2005). Warnick and Sanders (1980) had 
participants watch a video of a crime and then either work alone, or in small groups, in order to 
recall the crime. Some of the groups were asked to reach unanimous decisions whereas others 
were not. They found that group discussion, both with and without consensus decisions, led to 
significantly increased overall accuracy compared to individuals recalling alone.  Groups also 
were superior to individuals when it came to the completeness of the crime reports (Warnick & 
Sanders, 1980). In sum, the literature is inconclusive regarding whether co-witness discussions 
are harmful or helpful. Perhaps the broader literature on collaboration can shed light on the costs 
and benefits of remembering with a partner. 
 
 6 
Collaborative Memory  
A lot of research has focused on individuals remembering alone, but we often retrieve 
and reconstruct memories with others. To study how collaboration impacts memory, participants 
recall stimuli either alone or in collaboration with another participant (Basden, Basden, & Henry, 
2000;  Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). Pair performance is then compared to nominal groups (i.e., 
pooling the original scores of two or more individuals but counting their redundant items only 
once). Collaborative groups tend to recall less than nominal groups, a phenomenon referred to as 
collaborative inhibition (Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). The most commonly cited cognitive 
mechanism thought to explain collaborative inhibition is the retrieval-strategy disruption 
hypothesis (Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997). This hypothesis proposes that 
individuals use strategies to organize newly learned information that are unique to each 
individual; when these strategies are subsequently followed it leads to greater retrieval. However, 
Basden et al. (1997) suggested that when individuals are forced to collaborate, it may result in 
collaborative inhibition because being exposed to a different group member’s responses may 
disrupt one’s own retrieval strategy. However, studies have shown that even though information 
may be lost during group recall, the lost information often tends to reappear when participants 
are asked to subsequently recall the information on their own (Blumen & Rajaram, 2008; Finlay, 
Hitch, & Meudell, 2000).  
But there can be both costs and benefits when individuals remember together. Weldon 
and Bellinger (1997) found that when participants were given a second recall test, the 
participants who were initially tested in Collaborative groups recalled more than the participants 
that were tested Individually. In comparing ICI and III conditions, Blumen and  Rajaram (2008) 
also found that when a participant was re-exposed to the information in the collaborative 
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condition it led to increased recall and reminiscence on their final test. Their results suggested 
that allowing an individual to establish their own individual retrieval strategies prior to 
collaboration can lead to benefitting from the re-exposure of information during group 
collaboration, which in turn improves recall when the individual is tested alone. Some have 
argued that a potential benefit of collaborative groups is that they tend to recall fewer errors 
(Harris, Barnier, & Sutton, 2013). This is thought to occur because group members may 
recognize, and prune out, each other’s errors (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010; Ross, Spencer, 
Blatz, & Restorick, 2008). However, it is important to note that not all errors are pruned out. 
Occasionally, when an individual makes an error, the group members do not realize the error, 
leading this error to “contaminating” their group’s memory. This is known as social contagion of 
memory errors (Meade & Roediger, 2002; Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001).  When a free-
flowing method of collaboration is used, this leads to fewer memory errors because participants 
can interact freely and more readily correct one another. Conversely, when a turn-taking 
procedure is used, participants cannot discuss possible errors and intrusions are more likely to 
occur (Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2010).  
In sum, our first issue of interest is to identify how collaboration affects recall 
consistency. We hypothesize that recalling with a partner will enhance the ability to reminisce 
details on future tests. Because test one is done individually, we assume that individuals structure 
their own unique strategies, but they have an opportunity to be re-exposed to this information 
when they collaborate on test two, which together will lead them to reminisce items they 
previously had not remembered.  
We next introduce how memory has been traditionally studied, with an emphasis on the 
amount that is remembered (input-bound accuracy), and then discuss how to measure memory to 
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highlight the accuracy of what is recalled (output-bound accuracy). These two measures will 
allow us to assess, respectively, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.  
Accuracy of Memory 
Historically, memory research has focused on the amount of information that is recalled. 
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) referred to this as the storehouse metaphor of memory, which 
conceptualized memory as “something that can be counted.” According to the storehouse 
metaphor, memory is a structure where memory items are deposited and later retrieved (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996a). The venerable list-learning paradigm follows from this metaphor: 
participants learn a list of words, then later retrieve the words, with participants’ memory 
evaluated by the amount of recalled words (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996a). The storehouse 
metaphor is a quantity-oriented approach focusing on how much is recovered (an assessment of 
the whole truth). Quantity-based measures are referred to as input-bound because they assess the 
chances that an input stimulus will be reproduced (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). According to the 
storehouse metaphor, participants are held accountable for what they fail to report (i.e., what they 
forgot). Even though the storehouse metaphor has resulted in important research revealing 
factors that affect how much can be remembered, Koriat and Goldsmith (1996a) propose that 
how much an individual can recall matters little in day-to-day situations.  
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) also referenced a correspondence metaphor that 
conceptualized memory “as something that can be counted on” (p.3). The key here is the degree 
of correspondence between what is reported and what actually occurred (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1994). According to the correspondence metaphor, the key aspect of performance is referred to 
as output-bound accuracy (an assessment of nothing but the truth); it reflects the likelihood that 
each reported item of information is correct (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996a). In this approach, 
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accuracy is assessed based only on what an individual recalls, not by what they forget (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1994).  
In sum, our second issue of interest is how the output-bound accuracy of reminisced 
memories changes after multiple recall attempts, as well as identifying how collaboration impacts 
a person’s output-bound accuracy. We predict that collaborating will not adversely impact the 
output-bound accuracy of reminisces.  
Both studies set out to understand how collaboration impacts the accuracy memory, 
specifically looking at the accuracy of consistent, reminisced, and forgotten details. The 
literature surrounding collaboration and reminisced details in particular is scarce and both studies 




 Participants were 96 undergraduate students at the University of Oklahoma participating 
in exchange for SONA credit. There were 71 females and 25 males (M = 19.05, SD = 1.04). All 
participants gave written consent and were debriefed following the completion of the study.  
Design  
 The IIII AND ICII (I corresponds to individual recall and C corresponds to collaborative 
recall) conditions were varied according to a between-subject design. There were 40 participants 
in the IIII condition; there were 28 pairs in the ICII condition. Participants in the IIII condition 




 The stimuli included 40 random objects arranged on a table. All objects were items that 
were easy to name (cheese grater, envelope, battery, etc.). A number search was used as a distractor 
task after the study phase and in-between each of the recall tests.  
Procedure 
 Prior to arriving, participants were randomly assigned to either the individual or the 
collaborative condition. Participants were brought into a room and instructed that they would be 
taken into another room to view 40 random objects; their task would be to study the objects for 5 
minutes. They were notified that they would later be tested on their memory of the objects. 
Participants were told that they could touch the objects but must refrain from talking. After the 
study phase, participants were taken into another room where they completed four 5-minute recall 
tests with a 3-minute distraction task in between each test (see Figure 1). Participants were 
encouraged to try to remember for the entire time because the experiment would not continue until 
the entire 5-minute recall period elapsed.  
Participants in the individual condition were tested four times alone (denoted IIII).  
Participants in the collaborative condition were tested alone for test 1, and then collaborated on 
test 2. The pair was instructed to work with their partner to remember as many of the objects from 
the table. One of the participants was randomly assigned to be the writer for the test. Participants 
were told that they should both come to an agreement about remembering an object before the 
writer wrote down the object. These two individuals then recalled individually two more times 
(denoted ICII). 
Results 
The data from each collaborative and individual recall were classified based on whether 
the object was consistent, forgotten, reminisced, or an intrusion. Table 1 illustrates the 
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definitions of these different classifications. A consistently recalled object was one that was 
reported beginning on test one. A forgotten object was reported, but then not reported on a 
subsequent test. An object not reported a second time was still classified as forgotten. A 
reminisced object was not reported but was then later remembered; this designation was 
independent of when or how many times this occurred. For example, if an object was reminisced, 
and then reported again, subsequently this object would be considered part of a participant’s 
recall. Conversely, if the reminisced object is subsequently forgotten but then reported again 
later, it would be counted as reminisced. Lastly, intrusions were objects that were reported but 
were not originally studied. The output-bound accuracy scores, for both the IIII and ICII 
conditions, were computed for the consistent, reminisced, and forgotten classifications. 
Our main goals in this study are to identify how collaboration impacts consistency in 
recall and how accurate reminisced memories are after multiple recall attempts. We will first 
examine the input-bound accuracy followed by the output-bound accuracy of consistent, 
reminisced and forgotten memories, for both the IIII and ICIII conditions. Then we will examine 
the findings regarding the collaborative inhibition effect. To examine collaborative inhibition, 
the scores from the individual condition will be used to create a paired nominal condition for the 
evaluation of test 2 (the collaborative test in the ICII condition). This is done by pooling the 
reports of two individuals but only counting their redundant objects once (Weldon & Bellinger, 
1997). This technique creates a fair comparison of the collaborative condition to another “paired 
condition.” The nominal conditions for tests 3 and 4 were not pooled. 1 
Consistent  
 
1 In order to reduce the family-wise error rate, alpha was adjusted by dividing by the number of tests when multiple 
comparisons were made. 
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 To examine how collaboration affected consistent recall, a 2 (condition: individual vs. 
collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA was conducted. It revealed no 
significant interaction between condition and test F(l, 93) = .489, p = .243, ηp2  = .005. The main 
effect for condition also was not significant, F(l, 93) = .359, p = .276, ηp2  = .004.  However, a 
significant main effect of test was obtained, F(l, 93) = 89.22, p = .000, ηp2 = .490. Bonferroni-
adjusted comparisons indicated that .95 more objects were consistently recalled during test 3 
than test 4 (p = .000, 95% CI of the difference = .749 to 1.148). The amount of consistent 
recalled objects in test 3 (M = 19.20, SD = 5.68) was higher than test 4 (M = 18.24, SD = 5.68). 
Reminiscence 
To examine the likelihood of reminiscing after collaboration, a 2 (condition: individual 
vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for 
condition was not significant, F(l, 93) = .490, p = .243, ηp2  = .005. However, a significant main 
effect of test was obtained, F(l, 93) = 18.30, p = .000, ηp2 = .164, as well as a significant 
interaction between test and condition, F(l, 93) = 7.24, p = .004, ηp2 = .072 (see left side of 
Figure 2). Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated during test 3 the individual condition 
reminisced .705 more than the collaborative condition (p = .031, 95% CI of the difference = .068 
to 1.343). However, during test 4 the conditions varied by .425, which was not a significant 
difference (p = .099, 95% CI of the difference = -.082 to .932). These findings indicate that 
previously collaborating with a partner inhibited a participant’s ability to reminisce on test 3 but 
not test 4.  
Forgotten 
To examine how collaboration impacted forgotten items, a 2 (condition: individual vs. 
collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for 
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condition was significant, F(l, 93) = 31.23, p = .000, ηp2 = .251, as was the effect of test, F(l, 93) 
= 42.62, p = .000,  ηp2 = .314 (see right left of Figure 5). . The interaction between condition and 
tests was non-significant, F(1,93) = .253, p = .308, ηp2  = .003. Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons 
indicated that there were 1.427 more forgotten objects during test 4 than test 3 (p = .000, 
95% CI of the difference = .993 to 1.861) and the collaborative condition forgot 2.871 more 
objects than the alone condition (p = .000, 95% CI of the difference = 1.851 to 3.891). For both 
test 3 and 4, those in the individual condition forgot significantly fewer objects than those in the 
collaborative condition. It is likely that those in the collaborative condition forgot more because 
participants forgot some of the objects mentioned by their partner in test 2. 
Intrusions   
To examine how often intrusions occurred, a 2 (condition: individual vs. collaborative) X 
2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for condition was not 
significant  a, F(l, 93) = .091, p = .382, ηp2 = .001. There was no main effect of test, F(l, 93) = 
.469, p = .247, ηp2 = .005 and no significant interaction between condition and test, F(l, 93) = 
.1.37, p = .121, ηp2 = .015. For test 3, the individual condition (M = .60, SD = 1.02) had about the 
same number of intrusions as collaborative (M = .50, SD = .77); test 4 had similar results, 
individuals (M = .58, SD = .80), collaboration (M = .59, SD = .83). Both conditions were 
susceptible to intrusions, although intrusions were rare. 
In sum, the recall of consistent objects was greater on test 3 than 4, but condition did not 
matter. However, those in the individual condition reminisced more, and forgot fewer objects, on 




Input-bound accuracy indicates the proportion of studied objects that are correctly 
reported. It is computed by dividing the number of correctly recalled objects by the number of 
objects originally studied. To compare the input-bound accuracy for recalled objects, a 2 
(condition: individual vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted on the proportion recalled. The main effect of test was non-significant, F(l, 93) = 2.03, 
p = .079, ηp2  = .021, as was the interaction between condition and test, F(1,93) = .465, p = .248, 
ηp2  = .005, but the main effect for condition was significant, F(l, 93) = 3.99, p = .025, ηp2  = .041. 
Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that the input-bound accuracy was .056 higher for the 
collaborative condition compared to the individual condition (p = .049, 95% CI of the difference 
= .000 to .112). This may be due to participants in the collaborative condition incorporating 
objects that they had just previously recalled with their partner on test 2. When objects were 
reminisced with a partner on test 2, these same objects, if reported on test 3, will not be classified 
as reminisced, which explains the greater proportions of recalled objects for the collaborative 
condition. To better understand how the recalls from the different classifications fit together, 
Table 2 shows the frequencies for consistent, reminisced, and forgotten objects, intrusions and 
the total recalled (i.e., all the studied items recalled by the participant). The differences between 
the total recalled for the collaborative and individual conditions are easily identifiable in Table 2.  
Output-bound Accuracy of Consistent  
Output-bound accuracy indicates the proportion of reported objects that are correct. It is 
computed by dividing the number of correctly recalled objects by the total amount of objects 
recalled. To compare the output-bound accuracy for consistent objects, a 2 (condition: individual 
vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed no significant effects 
(main effect for condition, F(l, 93) = 2.48, p = .06, ηp2  = .026, main effect for test F(l, 93) = 
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.175, p = .338, ηp2  = .002, and the interaction, F(1,93) = 2.06, p = .078,  ηp2 = .022). These 
insignificant results are due to a ceiling effect: the output-bound accuracy of consistent objects 
did not differ in the individual condition on test 3 (M = .98, SD = .03) or test 4 (M = .98, SD 
= .03). Similar results were found in the collaborative condition in test 3  (M = .98, SD = .02)  
and test 4 (M = .99, SD = .03). These results are summarized in Table 3. 
Output-bound Accuracy of Reminisced Objects 
To compare the output-bound accuracy for reminisced memories, a 2 (condition: 
individual vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main 
effect for condition was not significant, F(l, 93) = .159, p = .346, ηp2 = .002. However, there was 
a significant main effect of test, F(l, 93) = 9.71, p = .001, ηp2  = .095, and a significant 
interaction, F(l, 93) = 6.80, p = .005, ηp2 = .068 (the left side of Figure 3). Bonferroni-adjusted 
comparisons indicated that there was a .34 mean difference from test 3 to test 4 for the individual 
condition (p = .000, 95% CI of the difference = .16 to .52): test 3 (M = .85, SD = .06) had greater 
accuracy for reminisced objects compared to test 4 (M = .51, SD = .08). As for the collaborative 
condition, there was a .03 mean difference from test 3 to test 4 (p = .699, 95% CI of the 
difference = -.12 to .19), and no significant difference in the accuracy of reminisced objects for 
test 3 (M = .66, SD = .06) and test 4 (M = .63, SD = .07). Taken together, these results indicate 
that being in the individual condition led to higher output-bound accuracy of reminisced objects 
for test 3, but not for test 4.  
Output-bound Accuracy of Forgotten Objects  
To examine the output-bound accuracy for forgotten objects, a 2 (condition: individual 
vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for 
condition was significant, F(l, 93) = 32.91, p = .000, ηp2 = .261, a significant main effect of test 
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was also obtained, F(l, 93) = 24.67, p = .000, ηp2  = .210, as was a significant interaction, F(l, 93) 
= 8.11, p = .005, ηp2 = .080 (see Figure 4). Participants in the collaborative condition had 
significantly higher output-bound accuracy for forgotten objects, especially on test 3. 
Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that for the individual condition, there was a .31 
mean difference from test 3 to test 4 (p = .000, 95% CI of the difference = .19 to .43); during test 
3 (M = .52, SD = .06), the output-bound accuracy of forgotten objects was lower compared to 
test 4 (M = .83, SD = .04).  
In sum, the output-bound accuracy for consistent objects did not differ by test or 
condition; objects that were consistently recalled had 98% or higher output-bound accuracy. 
Reminisced objects had a greater output-bound accuracy for the individual condition compared 
to the collaborative condition, but only for test 3. Forgotten objects had greater output-bound 
accuracy for the collaborative condition on tests 3 and 4 compared to the individual condition.  
Discussion 
The current study revealed that collaboration during recall results in both costs and 
benefits. On test 3, we found that collaborating led to less reminiscing compared to those who 
recalled individually, and that the output-bound accuracy of reminisced objects after 
collaboration tended to be less accurate than those who recalled alone. However, those who 
collaborated had a greater total recall on subsequent tests compared to those who recalled alone. 
We next will review these costs and benefits and then describe an alternative scenario to better 
highlight the impacts of collaboration. 
Individuals reminisced regardless of whether they were in the IIII or ICII condition. But 
contrary to our prediction, the IIII participants reminisced more on test 3 than the ICII. Basden et 
al. (2000) found similar results when they conducted studies with multiple study-test cycles and 
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had participants free-recall a list of words twice together and then conducted the final recall test 
individually. We had expected that collaborating on test 2 would re-expose studied objects to 
participants in the collaborative condition, and thereby enhance their ability to reminisce items 
not reported on test 1. However, this was not the case for test 3; collaboration induced a cost on 
reminiscing.  Meudell, Hitch, & Kirby, (1992) also found similar findings.  
But collaboration induced a benefit on overall recall. The number of total recalled objects 
on test 3 and test 4 were greater for the collaborative condition than the individual condition (see 
Table 2). These results replicated Harris, Barnier, & Sutton (2012); Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 
(2010); prior collaboration led to increased recall on subsequent individual tests. This is 
interesting because the reduced reminiscing induced by collaboration signals that the greater total 
recall is not due to additional new objects being reminisced. So where are the extra recalled 
objects coming from in the collaboration condition? Weldon and Bellinger (1997) suggested that 
these extra details may arise from being re-exposed during the collaborative test, which then 
makes them more accessible during later retrievals. Apparently, the collaborative test (test 2) re-
exposed objects from one member of a pair to their partner. These extra re-exposed objects, 
which cannot be reminisced because they were reported on test 2, increased the total recalled.  
All and all, when participants who collaborated are asked to subsequently recall alone (on tests 3 
and 4), the re-exposed objects that were brought up with their partner become more accessible to 
them in later tests, compared to participants in the individual condition, who had to rely on trying 
to reminisce objects not presented since the initial study phase. 
During test 3, there was a large discrepancy between the output-bound accuracy of 
forgotten objects for the individual and collaborative condition. The collaborative condition had 
greater output-bound accuracy due to the prior collaborative test (test 2). Test 2 had the highest 
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level of recall for the collaborative condition. Then, on test 3, individuals in the paired condition 
often forgot some of the objects they had previously recalled with their partner. This explains 
why the output-bound accuracy was high, because working with a partner likely resulted in 
pruning out errors in test 2. However, participants were not able to remember all of the new 
objects on test 3 on their own. It also appears that 50% of the objects in the individual condition 
that were forgotten on test 3 were intrusions, suggesting that the individuals were reconsidering 
objects that they had erroneously recalled. 
Taken together, there are both benefits and costs to collaboration. Prior collaboration led 
to greater recall on subsequent individual tests, but collaborating negatively impacted the ability 
to reminisce original study objects on later individual tests. One shortcoming of Experiment 1 is 
that every object was equally salient. In real-life, some details are more important than others. 
The consideration of a real-life scenario can help highlight additional aspects of the costs and 
benefits of collaboration. For example, suppose two witnesses experience a crime. The results 
from Experiment 1 suggest that reminisced details are less likely if these co-witnesses 
communicate with one another compared to if each witness recalled on his or her own. But on 
the plus side, witnesses who collaborate are able to recall a greater number of details when they 
are asked to remember again on their own (compared to individuals who remember 
independently). Although it is important to have the complete story about a crime and what 
occurred, it is also clear that reminiscing (reporting new details) happens to both those who recall 
alone and those who collaborate. Therefore, to understand more about how collaboration impacts 
reminisced details, research is needed using a more complex stimulus event to see if what is 
reminisced is impacted by collaboration. For example, collaboration, despite reducing 
reminiscing overall, may enhance reminiscing of key details because if an event follows a 
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storyline, remembering is driven by the details that drive the story (Alba & Hasher, 1983). An 
exploration of this issue is the primary goal of Experiment 2. 
Experiment 1 showed that collaboration harmed an individual’s opportunity to reminisce 
more than helping it, and when individuals did collaborate, their output-bound accuracy of the 
reminisced items following collaboration was not always as accurate as the individuals who 
recalled alone. The common objects used as stimuli for Experiment 1 revealed some interesting 
findings, but it is important to test whether the same findings occur in a situation more similar to 
eyewitnesses reporting on an event. If the current findings replicate, it will provide empirical 
support for the current protocol whereby police officers keep witnesses apart so that they do not 
communicate prior to being interviewed. 
Experiment 2 
Hypotheses 
 Experiment 2 will use a video that has a narrative. Schema theory is often relied upon 
when examining how we recall an event or story (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Bartlett, 1932). Schemas 
are knowledge structures that serve to complete an entire story by filling in gaps while 
organizing and prioritizing the elements of the event by their importance (Alba & Hasher, 1983). 
Because of the influence of schemas, we predict that the collaborative condition will have more 
reminisced details than in Experiment 1 because the organizational structure provided by a 
scheme provides more opportunities to reminisce than from the static objects used in Experiment 
1.  
 This use of a video narrative in Experiment 2 also allows for the opportunity to sort the 
type of information recalled. That is, there are both key and minor details that may be retrieved. 
This leads us to our next hypothesis: Those in the collaborative condition will reminisce more 
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minor details. An event has a narrative structure. Considering the retrieval strategy disruption 
hypothesis (Basden et al., 1997), individuals may organize and retrieve random objects in a 
variety of ways, but it seems logical to infer that when you consider the retrieval of an actual 
event, the common narrative structure makes it likely that individuals will utilize similar retrieval 
strategies. Consequently, it makes sense that two people collaborating would focus attention on 
the key details that drove the narrative rather than the minor details. Remembering key details 
that give meaning to the story are often remembered due to their importance in constructing the 
narrative (Alba & Hasher, 1983). Establishing this strong memory understanding of the key 
details may lead to these key detail memories being reported earlier in the recall period. 
Consequently, co-remembering key details on test 2 will help participants reminisce more minor 
details on subsequent tests because memory for a narrative is squared away.  
We also will examine the output-bound accuracy of the consistent details, where 
accuracy should again be very high, as it was in Experiment 1. However, we expect to see more 
intrusions in Experiment 2 because the switch to an  event that carries a narrative will lead 
individuals to make inferences and fill-in gaps when necessary (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Loftus, 
2003). But those in the collaborative condition will have fewer intrusions compared to the 
individual condition because working with a partner will prune out errors (Rajaram & Pereira-




 A statistical power analysis using GPower was performed for sample size estimation,  
based on the data from Experiment 1. The projected sample size was N = 126 people in order to 
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have .8 power to detect a medium effect size. Participants were 143 undergraduate students at the 
University of Oklahoma participating in exchange for SONA credit. The achieved power for this 
sample was .84 to detect a medium effect size. There were 97 females and 46 males (M = 18.78, 
SD = 2.00). All participants gave written consent and were debriefed following the completion 
of the study. 
Design  
 The study design is the same as Experiment 1: IIII AND ICII conditions in a between-
subject design. There were 47 participants in the IIII condition; there were 48 pairs in the ICII 
condition. Participants in the IIII condition were later randomly assigned to nominal groups 
creating 23 nominal pairs.  
Materials 
 The stimulus is an 8-minute clip from the movie Looking for Miracles (Sullivan, 1989). 
The video depicts the adventures of two brothers at summer camp. A number search will be used 
as a distractor task after the study phase and in-between each of the recall tests (see Figure 1).  
Procedure 
 The procedure has a similar format to Experiment 1 except instead of viewing objects the 
participants watched a movie segment. Prior to beginning the study, participants were randomly 
assigned to either the individual or the collaborative condition. Originally, this study was to take 
place in-person, however, due to Covid-19 restrictions, all sessions were collected via Zoom. 
 Participants joined a live Zoom meeting and were asked to turn on and have their 
cameras on for the entire study with their faces visible. The research assistant also had their 
camera on the entire time and was logged on during the duration of the entire study in case the 
participants had questions and to orchestrate the condition. Participants were then instructed by 
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the research assistant to watch an 8-minute video clip and informed that they should study the 
video carefully because their memory of the video would be tested. After watching the video, 
participants were instructed that they would complete four recall tests with a 3-minute distraction 
task between each test, all data was collected using Qualtrics.  
Rather than remembering all of the details from the video at once, recall was broken 
down based on the three scenes in the video. During the recall tests, participants were prompted 
with the scene of the video from which they should remember. For example, “The first scene 
took place in the dining hall. Please discuss what events occurred, who was in the scene, describe 
the people who were there and any other details you can remember, such as important 
conversations that happened.” Participants were then required to spend four minutes on each 
section for a total of 12 minutes across the three testing periods. Participants were encouraged to 
try to remember for the entire time because the experiment would not continue until each 4-
minute recall period elapsed. 
Scoring of the recall was subdivided by whether the reported details were key, minor, or 
extra details. A pilot study was completed in order to operationalize key versus minor details. 
Eleven participants viewed the video clip. In contrast to how things proceeded in the experiment, 
the pilot participants recalled after viewing each of the three scenes rather than after viewing the 
entire video. Key details were details that were reported in the pilot study at least 6 to 10 times 
amongst the participants and minor details were reported between 2-5 times amongst the 
participants. When scoring the data, a category called extra details was added that consisted of 
recalled details that were correct, judged relevant, but not already categorized as a key or minor 
detail. Table 7 lists all key and minor details that were included in Experiment 2 along with a 
couple example details that were considered extra details.  
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Participants in the individual condition were tested four times alone (IIII).  Participants in 
the collaborative condition were tested alone for test 1, and then collaborated on test 2. The pair 
was instructed to work with their partner to remember as many details from the three sections of 
the video. One of the participants was randomly assigned to be the writer. Participants were told 
that they must come to an agreement about remembering a detail before the writer typed it down 
into Qualtrics. These two individuals then recalled individually two more times (ICII). 
Twenty-three of the forty-eight collaborative tests were video recorded via Zoom. This 
was done to examine how the pairs worked together. We were interested in learning more about 
how the pairs decide about including, or not including, details in their recall, whether the writer 
or other participant contributes more to the group recall, and any strategies the pairs used when 
collaborating. 
Results 
Examining Collaborative Reminisced Key and Minor Details  
To compare how key and minor details varied between test 3 and test 4 for the 
collaborative condition, a 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) X 2(detail types: key vs minor) repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for detail type F(l, 95) = 67.26, p = .000, 
ηp2  = .415. However, both the main effect for test, F(l, 95) = 3.72, p = .057, ηp2  = .038, and the 
interaction, F(l, 95) = 2.36, p = .127, ηp2  = .024, were non-significant. There were more 
reminisced minor details (M = 2.34, SD = 2.51) compared to key details (M = 1.99, SD = 2.00). 
Table 5 categorizes the type of details by key, minor, and extra, and includes the frequencies by 




 To examine how collaboration affected consistent recall, a 2 (condition: individual vs. 
collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA was conducted. It revealed no 
significant interaction between condition and test F(l, 131) = 1.03, p = .157, ηp2  = .007. The 
main effect for condition also was not significant, F(l, 131) = .081, p = .388, ηp2  = .001. 
However, a significant main effect of test was obtained, F(l, 139) = 22.77, p = .000, ηp2 = .141. 
Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated that that there were .351 more consistently recalled 
objects during test 3 than test 4 (p = .000, 95% CI of the difference = .206 to .497). The amount 
of consistent recalled objects in test 3 (M = 26.75, SD = 9.57) was higher than test 4 (M = 26.43, 
SD = 9.58). The average frequency for consistent, reminisced, forgotten, and total recall is 
summarized in Table 4.  
Reminiscence 
To examine the likelihood of reminiscing after collaboration, a 2 (condition: individual 
vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for 
condition was significant, F(l, 139) = 7.11, p = .005, ηp2  = .049. A significant main effect of test 
was also obtained, F(l, 139) = 82.06, p = .000, ηp2 = .371, as well as a significant interaction 
between test and condition, F(l, 139) = 7.66, p = .003, ηp2 = .052 (see right side of Figure 2). 
Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons indicated during test 3 the collaborative condition reminisced 
2.34 more details than the individual condition (p = .003, 95% CI of the difference = .810 to 
3.871). However, during test 4 the conditions only varied by .074, which was not a significant 
difference (p = .846, 95% CI of the difference = -.681 to .830). These findings indicate that 
previously collaborating with a partner helped reminisce more details on test 3. These findings 
differ from what we found in Experiment 1.  
Forgotten   
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 The results for the mixed ANOVA for forgotten and intrusions violated the homogeneity 
of variance assumption and were not normally distributed.  In order to address these violations, a 
square-root transformation was applied and successfully corrected these issues.  
To examine how collaboration impacted forgotten items, a 2 (condition: individual vs. 
collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for 
condition was significant, F(l, 139) = 26.62, p = .000, ηp2 = .161, and there was a significant 
effect of test, F(l, 139) = 60.24, p = .000,  ηp2 = .302. The interaction between condition and tests 
also was significant, F(1,139) = 6.30, p = .007, ηp2  = .043 (see Figure 5, right side). Bonferroni-
adjusted comparisons revealed a 4.03 mean difference between the collaborative and individual 
condition (p = .000, 95% CI of the difference = 2.109 to 5.955), indicating that during test 3, the 
collaborative condition (M = 7.32, SD = 5.58) forgot more compared to the individual condition 
(M = 2.96, SD = 4.07). This was also true for test 4, the collaborative condition forgot (M = 8.66, 
SD = 6.47) more than the individual condition (M = 4.96, SD = 5.55).  
Intrusions   
To examine intrusions, a 2 (condition: individual vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. 
test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for condition was non-significant, F(l, 139) 
= .754, p = .194, ηp2 = .005, but there was a significant main effect of test, F(l, 139) = 13.82, p = 
.000, ηp2 = .090. No significant interaction was found between condition and test, F(l, 139) = 
.757, p = .193, ηp2 = .005. Although both conditions were susceptible to intrusions, intrusions 
were rare.  There were more intrusions on Test 3 (M = .55 SD = .87) compared to test 4 (M = .36, 
SD = .68) (see Figure 6). 
Input-bound Accuracy  
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 The Input-bound Accuracy and Output-bound Accuracy of Consistent Details data 
violated the normal-distribution assumption; the Output-bound Accuracy of Reminisced Details  
and Output-bound Accuracy of Forgotten Details violated the homogeneity of variance 
assumption and the normality assumption. To address these violations, both an arcsine and logit 
transformation were applied to the data. However, the logit transformation only fixed the input-
bound accuracy data. The transformations did not fix the violations for any of the output-bound 
accuracy data. Here we report the original results from the mixed ANOVAs but urge caution in 
interpreting the results given the violation of the homogeneity and normality assumptions.  
 To compare the input-bound accuracy for recalled objects, a 2 (condition: individual vs. 
collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA was conducted on the proportion 
recalled. The main effect of test was significant, F(l, 139) = 16.64, p = .000, ηp2  = .107. Neither 
the main effect for condition, F(l, 139) = 2.52, p = .06, ηp2  = .018 nor the interaction were 
significant, F(1, 139) = .092., p = .381, ηp2  = .001. The input-bound accuracy was lower in test 3 
(M = .64 SD = .13) compared to test 4 (M = .66,  SD = .14).  
Output-bound Accuracy of Consistent Details  
To compare the output-bound accuracy for consistent objects, a 2 (condition: individual 
vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
for test, F(l, 139) = 9.50, p = .001, ηp2  = .064. The main effect for condition was nonsignificant, 
F(l, 139) = .026 p = .436, ηp2  = .000, as well as the interaction, F(1,139) = .268, p = .303,  ηp2 = 
.002. The output-bound accuracy of consistent details was lower on test 3 (M = .97, SD = .05) 
compared to test 4 (M = .98, SD = .04). These results are summarized in Table 6. 
Output-bound Accuracy of Reminisced Details 
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To compare the output-bound accuracy for reminisced memories, a 2 (condition: 
individual vs. collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed two significant 
main effects (for condition, F(l, 139) = 5.25, p = .012, ηp2  = .036, for test F(l, 139) = 24.11, p = 
.000, ηp2  = .148). However, the interaction was non-significant, F(1,139) = 2.16, p = .072,  ηp2 = 
.015 (see Figure 3). The output-bound accuracy of reminisced details was higher in test 4 (M 
= .88, SD = .23) compared to test 3 (M = .65,  SD = .44). The collaborative condition had a 
higher output-bound accuracy compared to the individual condition.  
Output-bound Accuracy of Forgotten Details  
To examine the output-bound accuracy for forgotten details, a 2 (condition: individual vs. 
collaborative) X 2 (tests: test 3 vs. test 4) mixed ANOVA revealed that the main effect for 
condition was significant, F(l, 139) = 12.45, p = .000, ηp2 = .082, a significant main effect of test 
was also obtained, F(l, 139) = 27.80, p = .000, ηp2  = .167, as was a significant interaction, F(l, 
139) = 9.92, p = .001, ηp2 = .067 (see Figure 4). The results reveal that participants who were in 
the collaborative condition had significantly higher output-bound accuracy for forgotten details, 
for both test 3 and test 4. Bonferroni-adjusted comparisons revealed a .156 mean difference 
between the collaborative and the individual condition (p = .001, 95% CI of the difference = .069 
to .244), indicating that during test 3, the collaborative condition (M = .87, SD = .27) had a 
higher output-bound accuracy for forgotten details compared to the individual condition (M 
= .64, SD = 41). This was also true for test 4, the collaborative condition (M = .92, SD = .20) 
compared to the individual condition (M = .84 SD = .28). 
In sum, the output-bound accuracy for consistent details was similar, and very high, for 
both conditions (as in Experiment 1); details that were recalled had 97% or higher output-bound 
accuracy. Reminisced details had a greater output-bound accuracy for the collaborative condition 
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compared to the individual condition for test 3. Forgotten details had greater output-bound 
accuracy for the collaborative condition on tests 3 and 4 compared to the individual condition. 
Examination of the Collaborative Recordings 
 To understand more about how collaborative pairs work together, we reviewed twenty-
three recordings of the collaborative test. We first coded the degree of collaboration among the 
pairs and concluded that all pairs made a clear effort to participate and appeared to be engaged 
with the task. This determination was made by observing the interaction of the pair, making sure 
they both reported remembered details, and that a pair worked together instead of one person 
doing all of the work. The pairs were not instructed to use a specific strategy for recalling. 
However, 16 of the 23 of the partners took turns recalling details and the other seven pairs had 
one person recall everything they could and then had the other person do the same.  
We examined who recalled more details in the pair. A binomial test with exact Clopper-
Pearson 95% CI was done on the 23 pairs to determine if a greater proportion of the writers 
recalled more details compared to those assigned not to write (null hypothesis was equal recall 
from both participants). Of the 23 pairs, 6 (26.1%) writers recalled more details and 17 (73.9%) 
non-writers recalled more details. The writers reported significantly less details (95% CI of 
10.2% to 48.4%, p = .035). An independent samples t-test found that the participant randomly 
assigned to be the writer recalled (M = 17.86) significantly fewer details than the other 
participant (M = 24.83), t(44) = 2.44, p = .019, d = .72.  
Ten of the twenty-three pairs reported no intrusions in test 2. We reviewed how pairs 
handled intrusions by examining whether the pair had a verbal disagreement or discussion about 
an intrusion. Of the thirteen pairs that had intrusions, only four debated them. Three of the four 
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pairs that debated an intrusion corrected the intrusion (leaving it out of their final recall), the 
remaining pair debated it but included the intrusion in their final recall.  
Discussion 
 
Those who collaborated had a greater total recall on subsequent tests compared to those 
in the individual condition who recalled alone, and this was true for both tests (see Table 5). This 
replicates Harris, Barnier, & Sutton (2012); Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, (2010; collaborating 
leads to increased recall on subsequent tests.  
Experiment 2 also revealed that collaboration led to more reminisced details than the 
individual condition on test 3. This contradicts the result of Experiment 1. This change could be 
due to the change of stimulus to a narrative, making it easier to reminisce different parts of the 
event (Alba & Hasher, 1983). The output-bound accuracy for reminisced details was also higher 
for the collaborative condition compared to the individual condition on test 3. We predicted that 
the collaborative condition would reminisce more minor details on test 3 and test 4, because 
details that drive the narrative after often recalled due to their importance of carrying out the 
event (Alba & Hasher, 1983) and it seems appropriate to infer that the collaborative condition 
would recall the key details that led the narrative during test 2 when the pair works together. 
Having this strong memory for the key details can potentially then help participants reminisce 
more minor details on subsequent tests. We did not find a test effect; however, overall, there 
were more minor details than key details reminisced in the collaborative condition. 
General Discussion 
The present research examined the impact collaboration has on the consistency in recall. 
Of primary interest was the examination of reminisced details. Experiment 1 showed that 
collaborating led to less reminiscing compared to those who recalled individually, with lower 
 
 30 
output-bound accuracy compared to those who remembered alone. However, this cost of 
collaboration was only true for test 3. In Experiment 2, on the other hand, the collaborative 
condition reminisced more and had a higher output-bound accuracy compared to the individual 
condition. This benefit of collaboration was only found on test 3. Why did the material being 
learned impact how collaboration impacts reminiscing? 
One possible explanation is that the stimuli used in Experiment 2 had a narrative 
structure. As a result, both members of the collaborative pair should have highly similar retrieval 
organizations of the narrative, in contrast to their unique retrieval organizations constructed for 
the forty random objects that made up Experiment 1. The more similar retrieval structure 
allowed the collaborators in Experiment 2 to work together more effectively than the 
collaborators in Experiment 1. According to the retrieval-strategy disruption hypothesis (Basden, 
Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997), working with a partner to recall random objects can interfere 
with a person’s organization of information, which can disrupt the process of retrieval. It is likely 
that each person in the pair had a different way of organizing the random objects. However, 
when considering the stimuli used in Experiment 2, recalling a narrative facilitates the creation 
of more similar retrieval strategies for the two collaborators. Thus, when the pair collaborates 
during test 2, they work to piece together the narrative. The collaborative condition then 
continues on to test 3, recalling individually and has the advantage of having been re-exposed to 
the key details, resulting in a stronger memory of the narrative in test 2. The increase in 
reminisced memories found during test 3 by the collaborative condition is likely due to them 
reminiscing details that they remember now that they have this more thorough understanding of 
what occurred. Considering the alone condition, they also benefit from the narrative, however, 
they are not re-exposed to the information, as in the collaborative condition, making it harder to 
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reminisce all of the details on your own. Taken together, when reminiscing objects, working with 
a partner on subsequent tests induces a cost of collaboration. However, when recalling a story 
narrative, collaboration provides a benefit by increasing the reminisce details on tests 3. Being 
that narratives are similar to events that happen in our day-to-day lives, these findings may be 
more informative regarding how collaboration impacts our ability to reminisce. 
One finding that was clear in both experiments is that following collaboration, there is an 
increase in total recall (see also Harris, Barnier, & Sutton 2012; Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 
2010).  This increase in recall is likely due to being reexposed to the studied information during 
collaboration (Blumen & Rajaram, 2008). In Experiment 1, this increase is seen during test 3 but 
not test 2. That is because on test 2 we find evidence of collaborative inhibition. An independent 
samples t-test revealed that the nominal condition (unique recalls from two randomly paired 
individuals) recalled (M = 31.80, SD = 4.30) significantly more than those in the collaborative 
condition (M = 29.11, SD = 4.61), t(92) = 2.87, p = .005. There was also a collaborative 
inhibition in Experiment 2; the nominal condition recalled (M = 27.91, SD = 3.49) significantly 
more than those in the collaborative condition (M = 23.15, SD = 5.01), t(69) = 4.03, p = .000). 
Collaborative inhibition is a well-documented phenomenon and a robust cost of collaborative 
remembering (Rajaram, 2011; Vredeveldt, Hildebrandt, & Van Koppen, 2016; Weldon & 
Bellinger, 1997). 
The collaborative inhibition findings suggest that during collaborative recall there is a 
disruption to the retrieval strategy on test 2 that results in an individual recalling less than when 
remembering together (Basden et al., 1997). For example, one person may have the objects or 
event organized in a way that seemed logical to them, but their partner may disrupt this 
organization by starting to recall from a different starting point. Diehl and Stroebe (1987) 
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suggest that collaborative inhibition also may occur due to production blocking, which is a 
limitation due to having only person being able to speak at a time. Diehl and Strobe suggest a 
number of impacts of  production blocking: One partner may forget his or her idea while the 
other is speaking, the value of what one person reports may make the other person feel that their 
ideas are not as valuable, or having to keep remembering what you want to report while your 
partner recalls things can interfere with your ability to remember new ideas. What is clear is that 
when individuals go from working together (test 2) to recalling alone (tests 3 and 4), we see a 
large increase in total recall. This increase can be explained by the individual now being able to 
organize the information that was re-exposed during test 2 in the way he or she prefers. 
Consequently, during test 3 and 4, they are able to reinstate a preferred strategy and recall what 
they remember without disruption.  
When investigating how collaboration impacted forgotten details and intrusions. We 
found that more details were forgotten by the collaborative condition, especially on test 3. This 
decrease can be explained due to pairs working together on test 2, and then individually on test 3, 
and not being able to remember every detail their partner reported in test 2. Another benefit of 
collaboration is that you have a partner to discuss and confirm if what you believe is correct. The 
free-recall method allowed for pairs to prune out any details they disagreed on, although we 
observed only 3 of the 23 recorded collaborative pairs engaging in error pruning (Harris et al., 
2013; Rajaram, 2011; Ross et al., 2008). The lower output-bound accuracy in the individual 
condition likely resulted from the participants in the individual condition carrying their errors 
forward to subsequent tests because they have no way to check if they are right.  
Both experiments found that details that are consistently recalled are recalled with an 
extremely high output-bound accuracy, so good that potential effects of collaboration might have 
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been masked by a ceiling effect. The output-bound accuracy of consistent memories shows that 
the stability of output-bound accuracy does not change after multiple recalls, and this is true 
whether you recall alone or previously with a partner. Having high accuracy of consistent 
memories is a finding that has been found previously (Evans & Fisher, 2011; Smeets et al., 2017; 
Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). This stability in memory accuracy across tests was also found by 
Krix et al. (2015), which contradicted what police detectives believed would happen to accuracy 
over repeated testing. 
One factor that can adversely influence the output-accuracy of consistent details is if 
participants are forced to recall a certain number of details. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996b) 
pointed out that when individuals are given the option to provide by free-report or free-recall, the 
person is given the opportunity to control what they report. When these are the circumstances, it 
is common for people to only report information they think is right (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996b).  
High consistent output-bound accuracy goes hand and hand with being in control of your 
memory output and being able to report what you know is right while leaving out intrusions. 
However, what if there is a limit set to what you must remember. Consider a situation where a 
police officer encourages a witness to tell them more because they need more information. In 
these types of situations, the individual is pushed to report more than they feel comfortable 
doing, and this can adversely impact memory accuracy. If participants are not allowed to control 
what they report, they may feel encouraged to guess, which will result in the reporting of 
intrusions. Intrusions will also be more prevalent if stimuli are highly related. Take the Deese-
Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, which found that if participants are presented with 
semantically related words (e.g., emotion, fear, temper, rage) during encoding, it is highly likely 
that participants will recall words that were not originally studied but that have similar meanings 
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to the studied words (e.g., anger). It can be expected that if DRM word lists were used, the 
amount of intrusions would increase, which would negatively impact the output-bound accuracy.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Our study is not without its limitations. One limitation is that Experiment 1 was 
conducted in-person whereas Experiment 2 was conducted via Zoom due to the pandemic. In 
other words, stimulus type (objects vs. video) was confounded with method of conducting the 
experiment (in-person vs. Zoom). Although we believe that the differing stimulus type between 
Experiments 1 and 2 impacted our findings, it is possible that in-person versus Zoom also 
contributed.  However, Ekeocha and Brennan (2008) had participants recalling a story as a group 
either face-to-face or in electronic groups and found that there were no significant differences in 
their recall proportions of correct and incorrect items. Perhaps Zoom facilitated the benefits of 
collaboration. For example, when pairs recall together on zoom, it may ease social anxiety 
compared to working together with a stranger in the laboratory.  
The movie-clip used in Experiment 2 had a narrative that was about a summer camp, with 
a lot of details that could have been recalled. However, a future direction for this research could 
be to use a video involving a mock-crime event, because we know that eyewitnesses often 
experience a crime with others (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008) and previous eyewitness literature 
research has found that emotional stress can harm memory (Christianson, 1992). Being that 
many crimes are unpleasant events that often induce stress, it would wise to consider using a 
mock-crime event. This type of stimuli could look deeper into details that matter during crimes 
(e.g. clothing of the culprit, type of car, whether there were weapons).  
In conclusion, the current literature has led to unsettled decisions as to whether co-
witnesses communicating is harmful or helpful. Unfortunately, due to the differing results found 
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in our experiments, more research is needed to identify the impact that communicating has on 
co-witnesses. Both observed both costs and benefits of collaboration. We saw an initial cost of 
collaborating on test 2 where collaborative remembering results in reduced recall compared to 
nominal groups. This negatively impacts recall during the actual collaborative remembering task. 
But thereafter, whether you see a cost or benefit on reminiscing depends on what the stimulus 
was. Experiment 1, conducted in-person using memory for random objects, showed that 
collaborating negatively impacted the amount of reminisced details. Experiment 2, conducted on 
Zoom using a narrative video, showed that collaboration benefited the reminisced details recalled 
during test 3. Another advantage of collaborating is that it led to greater total recall on 
subsequent tests. Another benefit that derives from collaborative remembering is the ability to 
work through what is the correct and wrong information. This gives pairs an ability to discuss 
and evaluate their memories and prune out errors, which puts individuals recalling alone at a big 
disadvantage.   
Recall changes over time and inconsistencies in memory does not indicate memory is 
unreliable (Stanley & Benjamin, 2016). It is normal for individuals forget and reminisce 
memories at different times. However, the accuracy of the reminisced details does tend to decline 
over multiple recalls whereas the accuracy of consistent details stays stable regardless of if you 
recall with a partner or not.  
A practical implication of these experiments is that eyewitness statements should be 
taken individually rather than collaboratively. This is because we know that when collaborative 
remembering takes place, it leads to fewer recalled details. However, after collaboration, on 
subsequent recalls, it is likely that these individuals would have a better memory of the event 
because they were re-exposed to some details when recalling with other witnesses. Most crimes 
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occur when police are not present and witnesses will often communicate before the they arrive. 
However, as long as witnesses’ statements are not collected together, there may be opportunity to 
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Note. The top of the table depicts four studied objects: leaf, hanger, racecar, and button. Below are 
possible recalled objects on Tests 1, 2 and 3, which will serve to illustrate the following four 
classifications: Consistent, Reminisced, Forgotten, and Intrusions. The recall of the racecar is 
classified as consistent because it was reported on all three tests. The recall of the button on test 3 
Visual Representation of the Retention Possibilities 
 
Study  Phase  
  
 
Test 1  Test 2  Test 3 




















is a reminisce because this was its first recall. Despite being reported on test 1, the leaf also is 
reminisced in test 3 because it was not reported on test 2. Every time an object is forgotten and 
then later recalled, it is counted as reminisced. Forgotten objects were objects that were previously 
recalled, then not reported; the hanger was forgotten on test 3. Intrusions (key and lipstick) are 
























Average frequency (SD) for recalled, consistent, reminisced, and 
forgotten items by condition and test 







Consistent 19.56 (5.73) 18.93 (5.69) 









23.85 (5.17) 26.19 (5.93) 
Test 4 
 
Individual  Collaborative Condition 
Consistent 18.68 (5.56) 17.91 (5.81) 






































Output-bound accuracy (SD) for consistent, reminisced, and forgotten 
objects by condition and test 
 Individual Collaborative Condition 
Test 3   
Consistent .98 (.03) .98 (.02) 
Reminisced .84 (.34) .66 (.44) 
Forgotten .51 (.48) .91 (.24) 
   
Test 4 Individual  Collaborative Condition 
Consistent .98 (.03) .99 (.03) 
Reminisced .50 (.49) .63 (.47) 


























Average frequency (SD) for recalled, consistent, reminisced, and 
forgotten items by condition and test 







Consistent 27.13 (9.30) 26.56 (9.74) 









37.38 (10.68) 42.08 (10.01) 
Test 4 
 
Individual  Collaborative Condition 
Consistent 26.70 (9.51) 26.29 (9.66) 






















Average frequency (SD) for recalled, consistent, reminisced, and forgotten items by 
condition and test 
 Consistent Reminisced Forgotten Intrusions Total Recalled 
Test 3       
Individual     .61 (80) 37.38 (10.68) 
Key 10.94 (3.69) .98 (1.67) .72 (1.35)   
Minor  5.17 (2.66) .94 (1.07) .70 (.95)   
Extra  11.02 (4.61) 2.66 (2.51) 1.53 (2.52)   
Collaborative     .53 (.91) 42.08 (10.01) 
Key 9.79 (4.05) 1.53 (1.38) 1.88 (1.79)   
Minor  4.20 (2.59) 1.85 (1.70) 1.95 (1.64)   
Extra  12.19 (5.28) 3.59 (2.80) 3.58 (3.66)   
Test 4      
Individual     .36 (57) 38.32 (10.64) 
Key 10.74 (3.75) .36 (1.21) 1.32 (1.69)   
Minor  5.04 (2.67) .28 (.74) 1.02 (1.26)   
Extra  10.91 (4.68) 1.36 (1.22) 2.63 (3.76)   
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Collaborative     .34 (.72) 43.32 (10.68) 
Key 9.70 (4.07) .46 (61) 2.19 (2.02)   
Minor  4.13 (2.59) .49 (81) 2.20 (1.74)   





















Output-bound accuracy (SD) for consistent, reminisced, and forgotten 
objects by condition and test 
 Individual Collaborative Condition 
Test 3   
Consistent .97 (.04) .98 (.06) 
Reminisced .77 (.33) .93 (.12) 
Forgotten .64 (.41) .87 (.27) 
   
Test 4 Individual  Collaborative Condition 
Consistent .98 (.03) .98 (.05) 
Reminisced .62 (.42) .67 (.44) 




Experiment 2 Key, Minor, and Example Extra Details  
Key Details 
S1.1. Rich people arrived in cars 
S1.2. A cake was brought out for Moose 
S1.3. Boy/Delany stood on a chair to get everyone’s attention 
S1.4. Boy/Delany fell off the chair 
S1.5.The women scolded Delany after he fell and told him he was responsible for everything running 
smoothly. 
S2.1 People were walking down to the docks/river/lake 
S2.2.People get on the small paddle boats 
S2.3. Scared and looking out for snakes 
S2.4. Man tells Delany/Boy to take the lead boat 
S2.5. Boy talks about Indian history 
S2.6. Women panic and jump off the boat 
S2.7. Delany/Boy stays and kills the snake 
S2.8. Delany/Boy says the camp should have more contact sports(wrestling) 
S3.1. Sullivan/Boy is being bullied 
S3.2. Two boys push Sullivan/Boy into the water 
S3.3. Delany/Boy comes to help and tells the two boys to scram 
S3.4. Delany/Boy tells Sullivan/Boy that he is tired of sticking up for him 
S3.5. Sullivan/Boy says he doesn’t need his brother sticking up for him 
S3.6. Sullivan/Boy doesn’t have any friends because the others don’t like him 
S3.7. Sullivan/Boy runs away 
S3.8. Older woman watches from the window 
 
Minor Details 
S1. 1. Everyone was chanting “Moose” 
S1. 2. Details about the cake (Says Happy Birthday Moose, Brown-black cake, Blue letters) 
S1. 3. The women says that there are over 500 causes to donate to the camp 
S1. 4. The cook gives Boy/Delany a chair 
S1. 5. Boy/Delany falls onto food 
S2.1. People are going on a tour of the lake 
S2.2. Boy gets into the boat with the snake 
S2.3. A boy jumps into the water 
S2.4. Everyone tells Delany/Boy to jump out of the boat 
S2.5. Man takes the paddle with the snake and waves it congratulatory in the air 
S2.6. The older lady looks annoyed 
S3.1. One boy jumps into the water to push Sullivan/Boy/him under water 
S3.2. Delany/Boy/Older brother helps Sullivan/Boy/Younger brother out of the water 
S3.3. The other two boys run away laughing 
S3.4. Sullivan/Boy/Younger brother is upset because no one wants to be his friend 
S3.5. Delany/Older boy suggests moving him to another cabin 
S3.6. Delany/Older boy tells Sullivan/Younger boy to get some friends to stick up for him 
 
Extra examples  
1. A miscommunication between the women as they discuss whether or not there will be snakes on the boat 
2. Delany was trying to inform every one of their plans for the afternoon 





Figure 1. The left-hand panel gives the Study Design for Experiment 1 and the righthand panel 













Figure 2. Reminisced objects from test 3 and test 4 in Experiments 1 and 2. The individual 






























Figure 3. The output-bound accuracy of reminisced objects for test 3 and test 4 in Experiments 1 


































































Figure 5. Forgotten details from test 3 and test 4 in Experiment 1 and 2. The individual condition 


























Figure 6. Intrusions from test 3 and test 4 in Experiment 2. The individual condition refers to IIII 
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